Interplay between social infuence and competitive strategical games in multiplex networks by Amato, Roberta et al.
Interplay between social influence and competitive strategical games in multiplex
networks
Roberta Amato,1, 2 Albert Dı´az-Guilera,1, 2 and Kaj-Kolja Kleineberg3, ∗
1Departament de Fisica de la Mate`ria Condensada,
Marti i Franques 1, Universitat de Barcelona, 08028 Barcelona, Spain
2Institute of Complex Systems (UBICS), Universitat de Barcelona, Mart´ı i Franque`s 1, E-08028, Barcelona, Spain
3Computational Social Science, ETH Zurich, Clausiusstrasse 50, CH-8092 Zurich, Switzerland
(Dated: February 22, 2017)
We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and
social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains,
which we model as different layers of a multiplex network. We show that the coupling between these
dynamical processes can lead to cooperation in scenarios where the pure game dynamics predicts
defection. In addition, we show that the structure of the network layers and the relation between
them can further increase cooperation. Remarkably, if the layers are related in a certain way,
the system can reach a polarized metastable state. These findings could explain the prevalence of
polarization observed in many social dilemmas.
INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas are situations where individual inter-
ests are in conflict, like sharing resources or generating
common goods. These situations are commonly mod-
eled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma [1] or the Stag Hunt
game. Remarkably, cooperation in situations where in-
dividual interest are in conflict is surprisingly common
in reality, although defection has been shown to pre-
vail in many theories and controlled experiments [2–
4]. Several mechanisms have therefore been proposed
to explain the emergence of cooperation in these scenar-
ios, for example direct and indirect reciprocity (image
scoring/reputation) [5], kin and group selection [6, 7],
success-driven migration [8], or punishment [9].
Another mechanism responsible for the emergence of
cooperation in social dilemmas could be the fact that
strategic interactions between individuals or institutions
do not occur in isolation. In particular, individuals that
engage in strategic interactions are simultaneously ex-
posed to social influence and, consequently, the spread
of opinions. Following this line of reasoning, we assume
that social influence impacts the decisions of the play-
ers [10, 11], and that, vice versa, the decisions of the
players impact the opinions that are propagated in the
system. This consideration naturally raises the follow-
ing questions: Can the interplay between social influence
and game theoretical decisions enable cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas? And, what is the impact of the network
topology and the relation between the structure of the
social and strategical domain?
To answer these questions, we present a model where
game theoretical decisions and social influence take place
in different layers of a multiplex network [12–18]. In such
systems, each layer contains the same set of nodes, but
links are usually different in different layers. However,
∗ kkleineberg@ethz.ch
the layers comprising real multiplex systems are not en-
tirely independent, but exhibit certain relations [19]. As
we will show, these relations can lead to interesting be-
haviors, and hence have to be taken into account when
modeling such systems [20]. On top of this topology,
we model the dynamics taking place in the game layer
by a replication dynamics, where individuals imitate the
strategy of successful neighbors [21–23]. Furthermore, we
use a biased voter model [24] in the social influence layer
as a proxy for the spread of opinions. These opinions
can be seen as a proclamation of the intend of individu-
als regarding their choice of strategy in the game layer.
We assume that there is a tendency for individuals to
act in agreement with their proclamations, but allow, in
general, that individuals deviate from them. The impor-
tance for individuals to be congruent in both domains
constitutes the coupling strength between the different
dynamical processes. Finally, the aforementioned bias of
the voter model represents a general tendency towards
the proclamation of cooperative intentions, which could
be induced by appropriate media campaigns or similar
measures.
We find that indeed the coupling between evolutionary
game dynamics and social influence can sustain partial
cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where total defec-
tion prevails in the isolated game dynamics, and partial
or even full cooperation in the Stag Hunt game. In both
cases, for appropriate parameters, the state of full de-
fection can be avoided entirely. The role of the relation
between the different layers of the system is especially
interesting. In particular, only certain relations between
the layers give rise to a metastable state in which nodes
that adopt the same strategy self-organize into local clus-
ters. This state could explain the emergence and preva-
lence of polarization observed in many situations that
resemble social dilemmas.
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Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the multiplex model. Dif-
ferent layers denote the different networks that individuals
participate: on the top the Game Network (GN) and on the
bottom the Opinion Network (ON). Intra-links (black solid
lines) correspond to the individuals’ connections within each
network, while inter-links (green solid lines) indicate the cou-
pling between layers. On the right, the pictures show a sim-
plification of the dynamic occurring on each network.
RESULTS
Coupling between game dynamics and social
influence
In strategical games, individuals choose a strategy and
then obtain a payoff that depends on their own and other
players’ strategies. Here, we consider the two possible
strategies cooperate (C) or defect (D). The interactions
are then governed by the payoff matrix
M =
C D
C 1 S
D T 0
, (1)
meaning that if player 1 chooses to cooperate and player
2 cooperates as well, both collect a payoff of 1. However,
if player 2 defects, player 1 only collects the payoff S and
player 2 collects the payoff T , and vice versa. Finally, if
both players defect, both obtain no payoff.
In reality, individuals make many successive strate-
gic decisions and adapt their strategies over time. This
behavior is commonly modeled by a replicator dynam-
ics [21–23], in which individuals copy the strategy of a
randomly selected neighbor with a probability that de-
pends on the difference of the payoff of the two involved
players. In general, individuals tend to copy the strategy
of players who have earned a higher payoff compared to
themselves. Here, we use synchronized updates, meaning
that after each round of the game, in which each node
plays one game with each of her neighbors and payoffs
are distributed according to the aforementioned payoff
matrix, every node i chooses a neighbor j at random and
copies her strategy with the probability [25]
Pi←j =
1
2
(1− tanh [pii − pij ]) , (2)
where where pii and pij denote the payoffs of node i and
j.
Depending on the values of S ∈ [−1, 1] and T ∈ [0, 2],
there are different stable choices of strategies. In the
Stag Hunt game, for which we have S < 0 and T < 1, we
have bistability: both full cooperation as well as full de-
fection are stable stationary solutions. In the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, i.e. for S < 0 and T > 1, full defection is the
only stable strategy. In the Snowdrift game, S > 0 and
T > 1, the only stable solution is an intermediate density
of cooperators. Finally, in the Harmony game, S > 0 and
T < 1, only full cooperation is a stable solution.
However, in reality, individuals do not make decisions
exclusively based on the payoffs of their neighbors. In-
stead, individuals are simultaneously exposed to social
influence and hence the opinion of the peer group of an
individual cannot be neglected in understanding what
drives cooperation in strategic games. Opinions of in-
dividuals propagate through a contact network. This
behavior is widely described by the voter modelc [24],
where individuals adopt the opinion of a randomly se-
lected neighbor. We assume that propagating an opin-
ion that is considered anti-social, like defection in our
model, is less likely than propagating opinions which are
socially accepted, like cooperation in our model. This
could be the result of media campaigns or similar mea-
sures. We take this effect into account by introducing a
bias, β ∈ [0, 1], into the voter model. Individuals then
adopt the opinion of a randomly selected neighbor with
probability β if this opinion is cooperation and 1 − β if
it is defection. Values of β > 0.5 hence reflect a positive
bias towards cooperation in the opinion dynamics. The
opinion of an individual can be understood as her procla-
mation of intend regarding her choice of strategy in the
game layer.
As mentioned before, social influence has an impact
on the decision of individuals. To mimic this fact, we
couple the opinion propagation and game dynamics. In
particular, we define a parameter γ, which represents
the tendency of individuals to act in agreement with
their proclamations, and hence constitutes the coupling
strength between social influence and game dynamics.
In particular, at each update step, with probability γ a
node copies her state from one layer to the other, and
with probability 1− γ updates the strategy in the game
layer according to the game dynamics and in the opinion
layer according to the biased voter model (see Fig. 1).
Mixed populations
In reality, individuals or institutions interact in strate-
gic games via a contact network, like a network between
firms or countries. We will discuss the influence of the
3structure of the contact network and of the correlations
between different networks later. For now, we study the
model on a mixed population, in other words, we assume
a homogeneous and infinite population in the absence of
dynamical correlations and noise.
The mixed population (meanfield) assumption allows
us to derive differential equations for the evolution of the
density of cooperators cI in the game layer and cII in the
opinion layer (see Supplementary Materials),
∂tcI =(1− γ)cI(1− cI) tanh [〈k〉 (cI(1− T ) + S(1− cI))]
+ γ(cII − cI) ,
∂tcII =(1− γ)(2β − 1)cII(1− cII) + γ(cI − cII) ,
(3)
where S and T denote the parameters from the payoff
matrix, equation (1), γ ∈ [0, 1] controls the strength of
the coupling between the opinion and game dynamics and
β ∈ [0, 1] is the bias of the opinion dynamics. Finally, 〈k〉
denotes the mean degree of the contact network.
In the following, we discuss the dynamical properties
of the system described by equation (3) for fixed values
of β and γ. We find three regions of different qualitative
behavior, depending on the values of parameters T and
S. In particular, we find a region in which the system
effectively behaves like the harmony game (red region in
Fig. 2a), which means that only full cooperation in both
layers is a stable solution (see Fig. 2d). Furthermore,
we find a region where the system effectively behaves
like the snowdrift game (blue region in Fig. 2a). In this
region, the only stable solution is a mixed state, where a
finite fraction of the population cooperates (see Fig. 2f).
In this region, in general, the density of cooperators in
the game dynamics and those who proclaim cooperation
are not the same. Finally, there is a region which can
be described as a mixture of the two above cases (green
region in Fig. 2a). In this region, the system exhibits
a bistable behavior. Full cooperation in both layers is
a stable solution as well as a mixed state as described
above (see Fig. 2e). The bistable region emerges as the
system undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation. Let us fix
S = −0.2 and increase the value of T . At T = Tc,1 ≈ 0.77
the system undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation as a pair
of fixed points, one stable and one unstable, appear (see
Fig. 2b and c). Increasing T further, at T = Tc,2 ≈ 1.03
the system undergoes a transcritical bifurcation and the
solution which corresponds to full cooperation becomes
unstable. In the supercritical regime, only the mixed
state is stable.
To sum up, we have shown that the coupling to the
opinion dynamics shifts the effective behavior of the game
dynamics compared to the isolated case. The coupled
system exhibits effectively a Harmony-like behavior, a
Snowdrift-like behavior, or a mixture of both. Interest-
ingly, the coupling to the biased opinion dynamics suc-
cessfully avoids the situation of complete defection. So
far, we have considered a fully mixed, homogeneous pop-
ulation. In the following, we discuss the impact of the
topology of the underlying contact networks as well as
the relationship between the two layers of the system.
Impact of the structural organization of the
multiplex
Using the assumption of a fully mixed, homogeneous
population we have shown how the coupling to the biased
opinion dynamics can effectively transform the behavior
of the system. However, in reality, networks are heteroge-
neous and highly clustered, which can have a significant
effect on the outcome of dynamics taking place on the
network [26].
Furthermore, in reality, the social influence layer and
the strategic game layer are neither independent nor
identical. In other words, real multiplex networks are not
random combinations of their constituent layer’s topolo-
gies [19]. Hence, the contexts—or domains—in which
individuals make strategic decisions and by whom they
are influenced are related. In [19] the authors have shown
that these relations are given by geometric correlations in
hidden metric spaces underlying each layer of the system.
These correlations come in two flavors: popularity cor-
relations, which are correlations between the degrees of
nodes, and similarity correlations, which determine how
likely an individual is to connect to the same nodes in dif-
ferent layers. In simple terms, these correlations control
how “similar” the different contexts represented by the
layers of the system are. For further details on geomet-
ric correlations between layers of real multiplex networks
we refer the reader to [19]. Here, we focus on the im-
pact of these structural properties on the dynamics of
our model. What is, in general, the impact of geometric
correlations on the behavior of the system? In partic-
ular, do stronger correlations favor or hinder coopera-
tion? To answer these questions, we perform numerical
simulation using the geometric multiplex model (GMM)
developed in [19] (see Methods ). The model generates
networks with a power-law degree distribution and a tun-
able level of mean local clustering. Furthermore, we can
control the popularity correlations (by tuning parameter
ν ∈ [0, 1]) as well as the similarity correlations (by tuning
parameter g ∈ [0, 1]) independently from the individual
layer topologies, which allows us to study their impact
in isolation. We calculate approximated phase diagrams
similar to Fig. 2a using the generated networks by per-
forming numerical simulations. In particular, to capture
the bistable region of the system, we perform simulations
starting from different initial conditions, in particular
CI,II = 0.01 and CI,II = 0.99 respectively. For β = 0.7
and γ = 0.2, the system either reaches full cooperation
and consensus (“harmony state”), i.e. CfinalI , C
final
II = 1,
or a state where a mixed strategy prevails and full consen-
sus is not reached (“snowdrift state”). We find that there
is a sharp transition between these regimes (see Fig.1 in
the Supplementary Materials). We define a critical line,
above which the harmony state is reached with a prob-
ability of more than 50% (dashed black lines in Fig.2 in
the Supplementary Materials). The difference between
the critical lines for the different initial conditions is an
approximation of the bistable region, in which both the
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Figure 2. Behavior of the system for γ = 0.2 and β = 0.7 and 〈k〉 = 6. (a) Shows the phase diagram. In the red area, full
cooperation is the only stable solution and we effectively observe the behavior known from the Harmony game. In the opinion
layer, “cooperate” is the only prevailing opinion. This behavior is illustrated in the stream plot shown in (d) for T = 0.6 and
S = −0.2. In the blue area in (a), the only stable solution is a mixed state with 0 < CI < 1 and 0 < CII < 1, and in general
we have CI 6= CII . This region corresponds to T > Tc,2 ≈ 1.03. (f) shows this behavior as a stream plot for T = 1.2 and
S = −0.2. In the green area in (a), we have a bistable behavior, where either full cooperation is approached in both layers,
but the mixed state is stable as well. (e) shows this behavior as a stream plot for T = 0.9 and S = −0.2. In the bifurcation
diagrams in (b) and (c) this region corresponds to Tc,1 < T < Tc,2, where Tc,1 ≈ 0.77. Green solid lines represent stable fixed
points and dashed red lines unstable fixed points.
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Figure 3. Approximated phase diagrams (see Supplementary Materials) from numerical simulations. (a) Erdo˝s Re´nyi network
with mean degree 〈k〉 = 6. (b) Using GMM multiplexes, γ = 0.2 and β = 0.7, N = 10000 nodes, and mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6,
a power-law exponent 2.9 and temperature TGMM = 0.4. Layers are uncorrelated, i.e. g = ν = 0. (c) same as (b) but with
geometric correlation, in particular g = ν = 1. (d) shows the size of the “Harmony” area in the phasespace for different
parameters, i.e. the size of the red area in (a-c). The blue bar is for the Erdo˝s Re´nyi networks as shown in (a), the yellow bar
represent the GMM model without correlations as shown in (b), and the green bar denotes the GMM model with correlations
as presented in (c).
snowdrift state and the harmony state are possible solu-
tions. We show the result of this procedure for different
structural organizations of the multiplex in Fig. 3. We
observe that heterogeneous and clustered topologies in
single layers increase cooperation (compare Figs. 3a and
b). The presence of correlations between the layers in-
creases the region in the parameter space where the har-
mony solution is approached, and hence further increases
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Figure 4. Polarization of the system in the presence of angular correlations between the layers (g = 1, ν = 0) for a multiplex
with N = 5000 nodes, a power-law exponent 2.9, temperature 0.2, and mean degree 6 in both layers. Parameters of the game
are T = 0.8 and S = −0.4, the bias β is 0.7 and the coupling strength is 0.2. Results are for a single realization of our model
starting with a density of cooperators of 0.1 in each layer. A visualization of this realization is shown in the Supplementary
Video. The top row shows visualizations of the network layers. Color coded is the mean state of the each node, averaged over
time. Each time step denotes 1000 update steps of each node. The bottom row shows the evolution of the density of cooperators
in each angular bin. Numbers indicate selected clusters of nodes that tend to adopt the same strategy. Each timestep t denotes
103 rounds.
cooperation (compare Figs. 3b and c). To facilitate this
comparison, in Fig. 3d we show the size of the “Harmony”
region in the T − S phasespace.
The impact of correlations in the bistable region is es-
pecially interesting. We find that in this region angular
correlations lead to a metastable state in which nodes
that adopt the same strategy self-organize into local clus-
ters. These clusters are sets of nodes that are located at
small angular distances in the underlying metric space.
They emerge spontaneously and are metastable in the
sense that they can exist for very long times despite the
noise present in the system. This behavior is shown in
Fig. 4 and in the Supplementary Video. The emergence
of these clusters can be interpreted as a polarization of so-
ciety into defecting and cooperating groups. Finally, the
amount and size of the clusters is highly random and, as
a consequence, we observe a broad range of final cooper-
ation densities in this parameter region (see Fig. 5).
DISCUSSION
Cooperation is common in reality in social dilemmas
where many theories predict the prevalence of defection.
This contradiction could be resolved by taking into ac-
count further domains of interactions between individu-
als, in particular social influence.
We have presented a model based on multiplex net-
works with two layers. One layer represents the do-
main in which individuals engage in repetitive strategical
games. The second layer corresponds to the domain of
social influence, which we model using a biased opinion
dynamics. In particular, we consider a bias towards co-
operative attitudes. We have shown that the coupling
between these dynamics can lead to cooperation in sce-
narios where the pure game dynamics predicts the preva-
lence of defection. Furthermore, we have shown that
the coupling of these dynamics in combination with geo-
metric correlations between the layers of the system can
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Figure 5. Distribution of final cooperation (after 5 × 105
rounds) in the game layer among 50 realizations of our model.
The parameters are γ = 0.2 and β = 0.7, N = 10000 nodes,
and mean degree 〈k〉 ≈ 6. Network layers have a power-
law exponent of 2.9 and temperature TGMM = 0.4. Here, we
have fixed T = 0.6. Plots (a)-(c) show the uncorrelated case
(g = ν = 0) and (d)-(f) show the case of angular correlations
(g = 1, ν = 0). The value of S is shown in the respective plot
title.
lead to a metastable state of high polarization, in which
nodes that adopt the same strategy self-organize into lo-
cal clusters. These findings could explain the emergence
and prevalence of polarization observed in many social
dilemmas.
Real social and strategic interaction networks evolve in
time, and their evolution could depend on the strategic
choices of individuals [27, 28]. Hence, the inclusion of an
evolving and adaptive topology constitutes and interest-
ing task for future work. Furthermore, one could include
the competition [14, 29, 30] between different strategic
networks, or incorporate external noise [8]. Finally, our
findings suggest that hidden geometric correlations be-
tween different layers of multiplex networks can alter the
behavior of the dynamics taking place of top of them sig-
nificantly, and hence such correlations should be taken
into account in future research on dynamical processes
on multiplex networks [20].
METHODS
Geometric multiplex model (GMM)
The geometric multiplex model is based on the (single-
layer) network construction procedure of the newtonian
S1 [31] and hyperbolic H2 [32] models. The two mod-
els are isomorphic and here we present the results for
the H2 version. The construction of a network of size
N proceed firsts by assigning to each node i = 1, . . . , N
its popularity and similarity coordinates ri, θi and sub-
sequently, connecting each pair of nodes i, j with prob-
ability p(xij) = 1/(1 + e
1
2T (xij−R)), where xij is the hy-
perbolic distance between the nodes and R ∼ lnN (see
Supplementary Materials). The connection probability
p(xij) is the Fermi-Dirac distribution where the temper-
ature parameter TGMM controls the level of clustering in
the network [33]. The average clustering c¯ is maximized
at T = 0, linearly decreases to zero with T ∈ [0, 1), and
is asymptotically zero if T > 1. As T → 0 the connec-
tion probability becomes the step function p(xij) → 1 if
xij ≤ R, and p(xij) → 0 if xij > R. It has been shown
that the S1 and H2 models can build synthetic networks
reproducing a wide range of structural characteristics of
real networks, including power law degree distributions
and strong clustering [31, 32]. The use of these models
for the single-layer networks allows for radial and an-
gular coordinate correlations across the different layers.
The level of these correlations can be controlled by model
parameters ν ∈ [0, 1] and g ∈ [0, 1], without affecting
the topological structure of the single layers. The radial
correlations, related to the node’s degree, increase with
parameter ν—at ν = 0 there are no radial correlations,
while at ν = 1 radial correlations are maximized. Sim-
ilarly, the angular correlations increase with parameter
g—at g = 0 there are no angular correlations, while at
g = 1 angular correlations are maximized. See [19] for
details.
Finally, we extract the mutually connected component
of the system to avoid disconnected nodes.
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